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                                                              OPINION 
                                                         _____________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.  
 
Carolyn Freidrich (“Freidrich”) and Thomas Davis 
(“Davis”), both American citizens, were passengers on a U.S. 
Airways flight in 2010 from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to 
Munich, Germany.  Freidrich alleges that, during the flight, 
Davis left his seat and, while standing in the aisle waiting to 
use the lavatory, he fell on her, breaking her arm.  In 2012, 
Freidrich filed suit against Davis for her injuries in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
based on diversity jurisdiction.  Davis subsequently moved to 
dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The 
District Court granted Davis’ motion to dismiss.  Freidrich 
filed a timely appeal.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm.1 
 
 
 
                                              
1 The District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  This Court has jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
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I. 
 
Freidrich invoked diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a), claiming that she was a citizen of Ohio and 
that Davis was a citizen of Pennsylvania.  Davis filed a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
claiming that he was domiciled in Germany and no longer a 
citizen of Pennsylvania.  The District Court allowed for 
limited discovery on the issue of domicile and held an 
evidentiary hearing on November 20, 2013.  
 
Following the hearing, the District Court, in a 
Memorandum Opinion dated December 16, 2013, concluded 
that Davis is domiciled in Germany, not Pennsylvania.  The 
District Court made the following findings of fact:  
 
 1. Both Freidrich and Davis are American  
  citizens.   
 
 2. Davis was born in June 1951 in   
  Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 
 
 3. From 1985 to 1996, Davis lived in a home 
  he owned at 108 Blacksmith Road, Camp 
  Hill, Pennsylvania.   
 
 4. In 1996, Davis moved from Pennsylvania 
  to Germany.   Since  1996,  he has  
  continuously resided in Germany  with the 
  exception of a six-month period in 1999  
  when  he temporarily returned to   
  Pennsylvania for work.   
 
5. In September 1999, Davis sold his home  
  at 108  Blacksmith Road.  He currently  
  owns no property in  Pennsylvania.   
 
6. In July 2005, after deciding to remain in  
  Germany, Davis and his wife   
  purchased a home at Hintere   
  Gerbergass 7, Nordlingen,  Germany.   
  They continue to reside there.   
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7. Since 1999, Davis has owned his own  
  consulting company, Davis Consulting, a 
  German corporation with exclusively  
  German customers.  
  
8. From 2000 to 2011, Davis filed German  
  tax returns using a German address.   
 
9. Davis holds a German driver’s license  
  issued in February 1998.   
 
10. Davis holds a German residency permit  
  issued in October 2003.   
 
11. Since 2009, Davis has visited the United  
  States  approximately twice a year for  
  seven to ten days at a time primarily for  
  the purpose of visiting family in the  
  Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania area.  
 
12. When he visits Pennsylvania, Davis stays 
  with either his mother-in-law in a one[-] 
  bedroom apartment at 5225 Wilson Lane, 
  Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, or  with his 
  mother in a two-bedroom cottage in a  
  Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania retirement  
  community.  
 
13. Davis votes in U.S. national elections by  
  absentee ballot in Cumberland County,  
  Pennsylvania.  In September 2012, Davis 
  filed a Federal Post Card Application  
  Voter Registration and Absentee Ballot  
  Request [(“Registration and Ballot  
  Request form”)]. Davis listed [his home in 
  Nordlingen, Germany] as his current  
  address.  Davis listed his mother-in-law’s 
  Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania address as  
  his U.S. address for voting purposes.   
 
14. Davis checked a box on the Registration  
  and Ballot Request form that reads: “I am 
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  a U.S. citizen residing outside the U.S.,  
  and I intend to return.”   
 
15. Davis holds a Pennsylvania driver’s  
  license issued in August 2011. The license 
  lists his mother-in-law’s Mechanicsburg, 
  Pennsylvania address.   
 
16. From 2000 to 2012, Davis filed U.S. tax  
  returns using  a German address.  
 
17. Davis has a 401K retirement account with 
  American Express.  Davis also has a bank 
  account in Pennsylvania with Santander  
  Bank that he keeps in order to access U.S. 
  currency.   
 
18. Davis and his wife consulted local  
  German authorities about becoming  
  German citizens, but he has retained  
  his American citizenship.   
 
19. At his deposition, Davis testified that he  
  intends to remain in Germany for the rest 
  of his life.  He also testified that he and his 
  wife discussed the issue and jointly  
  decided to remain in Germany.  Davis  
  testified that his friends and his life are in 
  Germany.   
 
App. at 6–8 (footnotes omitted).   
 
 The District Court found that Davis, as an American 
citizen domiciled in Germany, is “‘stateless’ for the purposes 
of diversity jurisdiction, and he cannot sue or be sued under 
the diversity jurisdiction statute.”  App. at 10.  Therefore, the 
District Court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the dispute and granted the motion to dismiss.  Freidrich 
appeals.   
II. 
 
Freidrich contends that the District Court had diversity 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because she is a 
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citizen of Ohio and Davis is a citizen of Pennsylvania.  We 
exercise plenary review of a District Court’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as 
the question is one of law.  McCann v. Newman Irrevocable 
Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review a District 
Court’s factual findings for clear error.  Id.  “Under [the clear-
error] standard of review, our sole function is to review the 
record to determine whether the findings of the District Court 
were clearly erroneous, i.e., whether we are left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
 
 The statute governing diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a), provides: 
 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs, and is between— 
 
(1) citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state, except that the district courts shall 
not have original jurisdiction under this subsection 
of an action between citizens of a State and 
citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the 
United States and are domiciled in the same State; 
(3) citizens of different States and in which 
citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional 
parties; and 
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of 
this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of 
different States. 
 
For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, we have 
explained that “[c]itizenship is synonymous with domicile, 
and ‘the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and 
permanent home and place of habitation.  It is the place to 
which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of 
returning.’”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 286 (quoting Vlandis v. 
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973)).  “The party asserting 
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diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.”  McCann, 
458 F.3d at 286 (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)).  “A party generally meets 
this burden by proving diversity of citizenship by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  Id.   
 
 The Supreme Court, interpreting § 1332(a), has 
concluded that American citizens who are domiciled abroad 
do not satisfy any of the enumerated categories required for a 
federal court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction.  See 
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828-
29 (1989).  The Court explained, “[i]n order to be a citizen of 
a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural 
person must both be a citizen of the United States and be 
domiciled within the State.”  Id. at 828.  An American citizen 
living abroad is not domiciled in (nor a citizen of) any State 
and is therefore “stateless.”  Id.  And Americans living abroad 
are not citizens of foreign states because they are United 
States citizens.  Id. at 828-29. 
 
 Based upon Newman-Green and the language of § 
1332(a), we have stated that 
 
[a]n American citizen domiciled abroad, while 
being a citizen of the United States is, of course, 
not domiciled in a particular state, and therefore 
such a person is “stateless” for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction.  See [Newman-Green, 490 
U.S. at 828].  Thus, American citizens living 
abroad cannot be sued (or sue) in federal court 
based on diversity jurisdiction as they are neither 
“citizens of a State,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), 
nor “citizens or subjects of a foreign state,” see id. 
at § 1332(a)(2).   
 
Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 
2008).  This reasoning is consistent with the approach of 
other circuits.  See, e.g., D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities 
Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661 F.3d 124, 126 (1st Cir. 2011); ISI 
Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 316 F.3d 731, 733 
(7th Cir. 2003); Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 
60, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1990).   
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 It follows that if Davis, an American citizen, is 
domiciled in Germany, he is “stateless” for the purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction, as the District Court held, and cannot 
sue or be sued in diversity.  This conclusion, while troubling, 
is compelled by the language of the statute and by precedent 
from both the Supreme Court and our circuit.  We find this 
troubling because it closes the doors of federal court to a 
citizen of a State who wishes to sue another citizen based on 
diversity, as in this case.  It may be that this “stateless person” 
doctrine is an unintended consequence flowing from 
Congress’ now possibly outdated assumption that U.S. 
citizens generally reside in the United States.  See Swiger, 
540 F.3d at 188 (McKee, J., concurring).   
 
 We turn next to the District Court’s factual finding that 
Davis was an American citizen domiciled in Germany.  Such 
factual findings are reviewed under the deferential clear-error 
standard.  See McCann, 458 F.3d at 286.   
 
 Freidrich argues on appeal that, prior to living in 
Germany, Davis was domiciled in Pennsylvania, and this 
Pennsylvania domicile, “once acquired is presumed to 
continue until it is shown to have been changed.”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 18 (quoting Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 
345 (3d Cir. 2011)).  While the presumption of continued 
domicile does not shift the burden of proof to Davis, Freidrich 
argues that it “shifts the burden of production” to Davis “to 
provide ‘sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.’”  
Appellant’s Br. at 18 (quoting Washington, 652 F.3d at 345).  
Freidrich contends that domicile is a question of both physical 
residence and intent, and Davis, in his 2012 Registration and 
Ballot Request form, checked a box that declared his intent to 
return to the United States, instead of selecting a box stating 
“I am a U.S. citizen residing outside the U.S. and I do not 
intend to return.”  Appellant’s Br. at 13, 20-21; App. at 89.  
Thus, according to Freidrich, because Davis manifested his 
intent to return to the United States, he did not produce 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that his domicile 
continued to be Pennsylvania.  
 
We do not find clear error in the District Court’s 
conclusions that Davis produced sufficient evidence to rebut 
the presumption of continued domicile and that Davis is 
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domiciled in Germany.  The District Court’s finding of a 
German domicile is based upon both Davis’ actions and his 
declarations of intent.  Davis testified that he lives in 
Germany and that he intends to remain there.  Although he 
exercises his political rights in the United States, Davis does 
not exercise them at the state or local level.  From 2000 to 
2011, Davis filed tax returns in both the United States and 
Germany listing his address in Germany.  In addition, Davis’ 
home, business, and family are all located in Germany.   
 
Although Davis continues to have some ties to 
Pennsylvania, including some bank accounts and a 
Pennsylvania driver’s license, it was not clear error for the 
District Court to conclude that Davis rebutted the 
presumption of continuing domicile based upon other 
evidence favoring a finding of a German domicile.  With the 
presumption destroyed, the burden is on Freidrich to prove 
diversity of citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
Freidrich has failed to meet her burden.  Freidrich 
relies entirely on the Registration and Ballot Request form 
from 2012 in which Davis stated that he intends to return to 
the United States.  This alone does not satisfy the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  Davis testified that 
he made this selection on the form simply because he could 
not rule out the possibility that he may one day return to the 
United States.  History, and the uncertainty of the world 
situation, show the wisdom of that caution.  The vast majority 
of the other objective evidence in the record—evidence based 
upon more than mere statements of his intent—points to 
Germany as Davis’ “true, fixed and permanent home and 
place of habitation.  It is the place to which, whenever he is 
absent, he has the intention of returning.”  McCann, 458 F.3d 
at 286 (quoting Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 454).  We cannot 
conclude that the District Court’s finding that Davis was 
domiciled in Germany was clear error. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District 
Court’s grant of Davis’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
 
